



How the Great Firewall of China Detects and Blocks Fully Encrypted Traffic

Project Homepage






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What happened?




Server On November 6, 2021, the
Great Firewall of China (GFW)
started dynamically blocking
fully encrypted traffic in real
time. Such capability affected
a large set of censorship
circumvention protocols used
by tens of millions of users.

Fully encrypted proxies encrypt all traffic including headers, while protocols like TLS send plaintext headers.


Evaluating the Detection Algorithm

We simulated the traffic detection algorithm on a network tap at the University of Colorado Boulder. Our evaluation suggests that the false positive rate of the detection algorithm is as low as 0.6%.




Reverse Engineering the GFW

We sent millions of experimental probes past the GFW to reverse engineer what was blocked. We find **five rules** that govern blocking.



Effective and Immediate Mitigations




Patched Tools

Fraction of bits=1

integrated into all mainstream fully encrypted protocols.

These mitigations have helped

These mitigations have helped tens of millions of users in China and Iran to bypass the blockings.



Block the connection unless any of the following hold

Response Timeline



We took **immediate actions** to measure and understand the blocking. We **rapidly and responsibly** disclosed our research findings to both anti-censorship tool developers and the general public.

The blocking was likely **politically driven**, as it started 2 days before a major political convention and ended 2 days after the confirmation of Xi's third term.